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REFLECTIONS ON NORTHERN ROCK
A little over a year ago it would have been difficult to
imagine the severity of the storm which was about to hit
the banking markets in the United Kingdom (UK) and
elsewhere. There had been reports of some banking
problems in the United States and news stories about sub-
prime lending difficulties were starting to emerge, but the
growing liquidity freeze that was developing in the financial
markets was to intensify to a degree which no one appears
to have predicted.
In the UK the story has focused on the problems at
Northern Rock, a little known mortgage bank which was
not of particular systemic importance. Within the industry
it had been seen as a rising star which had been growing at
a particularly fast pace. The events of September 2007,
which included the first run on a bank in the UK since
1878 (when there were runs on several banks as a result of
the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank), were quite
astonishing. The last bank of any significance to get into
financial difficulties in the UK was the merchant bank
Barings in 1995. This received significant media attention
but Barings was not considered to be systemically
important and accordingly did not receive a bailout by the
government. Instead it went into administration and was
ultimately purchased by the Dutch bank ING. The Barings
crisis was dealt with quickly using the existing corporate
insolvency laws and the general view at the time was that
the outcome was satisfactory. There were no calls for
reform of the insolvency laws to introduce any special
procedures for banks. Barings had been dealt with quickly
and effectively at no cost to the British taxpayer.
How different it has been in the Northern Rock case.
The serious financial problems at Northern Rock were
reported by the BBC in September 2007, a day before an
official statement was to have been made by the relevant
authorities, and the run started. Another significant feature
was that this was the first banking crisis to take place under
the financial sector safety net which came into place in
1997 when responsibility for supervising banks was
removed from the Bank of England to the newly created
Financial Services Authority (FSA). This new mega-
regulator was to work in conjunction with the Treasury and
the Bank of England on the basis of a memorandum of
understanding.
Northern Rock’s problems provided the first
opportunity to see how the financial sector safety net
would operate. It is beyond the scope of this editorial to set
out in detail the events which took place but those who
would like to find out more should read The Run on the Rock
(a detailed report by the House of Commons Treasury
Committee published in January 2008). In addition to
concluding that none of the relevant parties come out of
this well, it was also felt that there were serious
shortcomings in the legal infrastructure. In particular the
lack of an appropriate vehicle for dealing with financially
troubled banks and deficiencies in the system for
protecting bank depositors were identified.
Northern Rock was subsequently nationalised in
February 2008 after a failure to find a private sector
purchaser. This was described by the authorities as a
“temporary” measure but at this stage it is impossible to
know just how temporary it is likely to be. However, the
bank’s business operations have been continuing to lose
money and its asset base is continuing to shrink. A
significant amount of the money advanced by the
authorities to Northern Rock has been repaid but this
appears to have been achieved by mortgage redemptions by
those borrowers who have been able to refinance from
other lenders. Effectively this means that Northern Rock is
losing many of those borrowers whose mortgages are fully
up to date and who have good credit ratings. Those who
are in arrears with their mortgage repayments will not be
in a position to refinance with other lenders and will
presumably stay put. Northern Rock continues to operate
in the market for deposits with the significant advantage
over its competitors of a government guarantee. The bank
is attracting deposits by offering relatively high interest
rates with the public being aware that these deposits are
fully backed by a government guarantee. This is certainly
not popular with competitors.
So what will happen to Northern Rock? The intention is
to return it, at some stage, either in whole or in part, to the
private sector. What is less clear is whether the public
funds used to bail it out will ever be repaid in full. Typically
where public funds have been used for bank bailouts there
tends to be a loss to the public purse and this may well
prove to be the case with Northern Rock.
WHERE TO FROM HERE?
What has come out of the Northern Rock crisis? It has
led to a series of consultations and reports and much
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discussion of all aspects of the workings of the financial
sector safety net.
It has been recognised that there were many
shortcomings. The FSA has been criticised for its approach
to the regulation and supervision of Northern Rock; the
Bank of England for its policy on emergency liquidity
assistance; the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Prime
Minister for continuous indecision and failure to take
action. All of the parties have been criticised for the poor
quality of communications between them despite the
memorandum of understanding that all were parties to.
The compensation scheme for depositors has been found
wanting. There were two specific weaknesses which
exacerbated the run on Northern Rock. First, the level of
cover was found to be insufficient and second, the delay in
making compensations payments was unacceptable. The
lack of a specific vehicle to deal with a financially distressed
bank was also considered to be a weakness.
There will undoubtedly be new legislation in place
within the relatively near future, and this will certainly
include a special resolution regime as well as changes to the
compensation scheme for bank depositors. There will also
be clearer rules to ensure that the authorities work
together more effectively with the responsibilities of each
of the parties being carefully set out.
SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
No doubt some good will come out of this. First, the
regulatory culture will surely be stronger in the future.
Second, banks will have to introduce more effective risk
management procedures both in relation to lending
policies and to funding their activities. Securitisation and
“pass the parcel” techniques will be far more carefully
scrutinised and controlled. Third, there will undoubtedly
be clearer rules on who is to have responsibility for doing
what, so that effective and timely action will hopefully be
taken in future.
The recent series of consultations has been worthwhile
and has provided the opportunity for a period of reflection.
This has led not only to a rethink about the UK’s legal
framework for dealing with financially distressed banks but
also to the whole issue of the financial sector safety net.
That the system did not work as well as expected is not in
dispute and it must work better in future if London is to
continue to be one of the world’s leading financial centres.
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